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Went on with the objectives section
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@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ hmargin=3cm
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\chapter{Introduction}
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\section{Motivation}
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%M-> Slightly long, but it summarizes and presents the ideas in order:
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%M-> SA bit long, but it summarizes and presents the ideas and background needed to understand the topic in order:
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% Main idea: Malware keeps evolving ->
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% -> Relevance of innovating and researching on the new techniques ->
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% -> Relevance of stealth software in targeted attacks->
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@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ As the efforts of the computer security community grow to protect increasingly c
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In contrast with ransomware incidents, which remained the most significant and common cyber threat faced by organizations on 2021\cite{ransomware_pwc}, another powerful class of malware called rootkits is found considerably more infrequently, yet it is usually associated to high-profile targeted attacks that lead to greatly impactful consequences.
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A rootkit is a piece of computer software characterized for its advanced stealth capabilities. Once it is installed on a system it remains invisible to the host, usually hiding its related processes and files from the user, while at the same time performing the malicious operations for which it was designed. Most common operations include storing keystrokes, sniffing network traffic, exfiltrating sensible data from the user or the system, or actively modifying the data at the infected device. The other characteristic functionality is that rootkits seek to achieve persistence on the infected hosts, with the purpose of being launched again after a system reboot, without further user interaction.
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A rootkit is a piece of computer software characterized for its advanced stealth capabilities. Once it is installed on a system it remains invisible to the host, usually hiding its related processes and files from the user, while at the same time performing the malicious operations for which it was designed. Common operations include storing keystrokes, sniffing network traffic, exfiltrating sensitive information from the user or the system, or actively modifying critical data at the infected device. The other characteristic functionality is that rootkits seek to achieve persistence on the infected hosts, meaning that they keep running on the system even after a system reboot, without further user interaction or the need of a new compromise.
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The techniques used for achieving both of these functionalities depend on the type of rootkit developed, a classification usually made depending on the level of privileges on which the rootkit operates in the system.
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\begin{itemize}
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@@ -333,19 +333,25 @@ Common techniques used for the development of their malicious activities include
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These rootkits are usually the most attractive (and difficult to build) option for a malicious actor, but the installation of a kernel rootkit requires of a complete previous compromise of the system, meaning that administrator or root privileges must have been already achieved by the attacker, commonly by the execution of an exploit or a local installation of a privileged user.
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\end{itemize}
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Historically, kernel-mode rootkits have been tightly associated with espionage activities on governments and research institutes by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups\cite{rootkit_ptsecurity}, state-sponsored or criminal organizations specialized on long-term operations to gather intelligence and gain unauthorized persistent access to computer systems. Although rootkits' functionality is tailored for each specific attack, a common set of techniques and procedures can be identified being used by these organizations. However, during the last years, a new technology called eBPF has been found to be the target of the latest innovation on the development of rootkits.
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Historically, kernel-mode rootkits have been tightly associated with espionage activities on governments and research institutes by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups\cite{rootkit_ptsecurity}, state-sponsored or criminal organizations specialized on long-term operations to gather intelligence and gain unauthorized persistent access to computer systems. Although rootkits' functionality is tailored for each specific attack, a common set of techniques and procedures can be identified being used by these organizations. However, during the last years, a new technology called eBPF has been found to be the heart of the latest innovation on the development of rootkits.
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%Yes, I am not mentioning that eBPF comes from "Extended Berkeley Packet %Filters here since apparently it is no longer considered an acronym, we'll %tackle that on the history section
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eBPF is a technology incorporated in the 3.18 version of the Linux kernel\cite{ebpf_linux318}, which provides the possibility of running code in the kernel without the need of loading a kernel module. Programs are created in a restrictive version of the C language and compiled into eBPF bytecode, which is loaded into the kernel via a new bpf() system call. After a mandatory step of verification by the kernel in which the code is checked to be safe to run, the bytecode is compiled into native machine instructions. These programs can then get access to kernel-exclusive functionalities including network traffic filtering, system calls hooking or tracing.
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Although eBPF has built an outstanding environment for the creation of networking and tracing tools, its ability to run kernel programs without the need to load a kernel module has attracted the attention of multiple APTs. In fact, on February 2022, the Chinese security team Pangu Lab reported about a NSA backdoor that remained unnoticed from 2013 that uses eBPF for its networking functionality and that infected telecommunications, scientific and military systems worldwide\cite{bvp47_report}. More recently, PwC reports about a China-based threat actor that has targeted telecommunications systems with a eBPF-based backdoor\cite{bpfdoor_pwc}.
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Although eBPF has built an outstanding environment for the creation of networking and tracing tools, its ability to run kernel programs without the need to load a kernel module has attracted the attention of multiple APTs. On February 2022, the Chinese security team Pangu Lab reported about a NSA backdoor that remained unnoticed since 2013 that uses eBPF for its networking functionality and that infected military and telecommunications systems worldwide\cite{bvp47_report}. Also on 2022, PwC reports about a China-based threat actor that has targeted telecommunications systems with a eBPF-based backdoor\cite{bpfdoor_pwc}.
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Taking all the previous background into account, and attending to the previous work on this matter by Jeff Dileo from NCC Group at DEFCON 27\cite{evil_ebpf} and by Guillaume Fournier and Sylvain Afchainthe from Datadog at DEFCON 29\cite{ebpf_friends}, we can confidently claim that there is a growing interest on researching the capabilities of eBPF in the context of offensive security, in particular given its potential on becoming a common component of modern rootkits. Additionally, there currently exists official efforts to extend the eBPF technology into Windows\cite{ebpf_windows} and Android systems\cite{ebpf_android}, which extends the mentioned risks to new platforms.
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Moreover, there currently exists official efforts to extend the eBPF technology into Windows\cite{ebpf_windows} and Android systems\cite{ebpf_android}, which spreads the mentioned risks to new platforms. Therefore, we can confidently claim that there is a growing interest on researching the capabilities of eBPF in the context of offensive security, in particular given its potential on becoming a common component found of modern rootkits. This knowledge would be valuable to the computer security community, both in the context of pen-testing and for analysts which need to know about the latest trends in malware to prepare their defences.
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\section{Project objectives}
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The main objective of this project is to compile a comprehensive report of the capabilities in the eBPF technology that could be weaponized by a malicious actor. In particular, we will be focusing on functionalities present in the Linux platform, given the maturity of eBPF on these environments and which therefore offers a wider range of possibilities. We will be approaching this study from a threat actor perspective, meaning that we will develop an eBPF-based rootkit which shows these capabilities live in a current Linux system, including simple proof of concepts (PoC) showing an specific feature, but also by building a realistic rootkit system which weaponizes these PoCs and operates malicious activities.
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%According to the library guide, previous research should be around here. %Is it the best place tho?
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Before narrowing down our objectives and selecting an specific list of rootkit capabilities to emulate using eBPF, we need to take into account previous research. The work on this matter by Jeff Dileo from NCC Group at DEFCON 27\cite{evil_ebpf} is particularly relevant, setting the first basis of eBPF ability to overwrite userland data, highlighting the possibility of overwriting the memory of a running process and executing arbitrary code on it.
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\section{Objectives}
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Subsequent talks on 2021 by Pat Hogan at DEFCON 29\cite{bad_ebpf} and by Guillaume Fournier and Sylvain Afchainthe from Datadog at DEFCON 29\cite{ebpf_friends} research deeper on eBPF's ability to behave like a rootkit. In particular, Hogan shows how eBPF can be used to hide the rootkit's presence from the user and to modify data at system calls, whilst Fournier and Afchainthe built the first instance of a backdoor with command-and-control(C2) capabilities, enabling to communicate with the malicious eBPF program by sending network packets to the compromised machine.
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Taking the previous research into account, and on the basis of common functionality usually we described to be usually incorporated at rootkits, the objectives of our research on eBPF is set to be on the following topics:
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\section{Regulatory framework}
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%MARCOS-> Is this the appropiate place? Looking at other TFGs it is sometimes here and others in a final chapter
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